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ABSTRACT 
 
It is often argued whether the American electorate is in a period of polarization (Abramowitz 
2010), partisan sorting (Fiorina & Abrams 2009), or geographic clustering; and what might 
be the causes of these observations.  Using election results from the 2012 presidential 
election and transit ridership data at the county level this article argues for the structural 
causes of partisan spatial segregation and seeks to show how variation in transportation 
access can influence partisan clustering.  This study does not find support for the ability of 
public transit access to decrease partisan clustering, but does find some support for the 
hypothesis that an increase in transportation access correlates to an increase in Democratic 
partisan clustering. 
Keywords:   Electoral Behavior, Geographic Sorting, Partisan Clustering, Polarization, Mass Transit, Urban 
Planning, Geospatial design impacts, 2012 US General Election 
 
 
 
RESUM EXPLICATIU 
 
Sovint es discuteix si l'electorat nord-americà es troba en un període de polarització 
(Abramowitz 2010), classificació partidista (Fiorina & Abrams 2009), o agrupació 
geogràfica; I quines poden ser les causes d'aquestes observacions. L'ús de resultats electorals 
a partir de les eleccions presidencials de 2012 i les dades del pilot de trànsit a nivell del 
comtat argumenta les causes estructurals de la segregació espacial partidista i pretén mostrar 
com la variació en l'accés al transport pot influir en el clúster partidista. Aquest estudi no 
troba suport per a la capacitat d'accés del trànsit públic per reduir el clúster partidista, però sí 
que dóna suport a la hipòtesi que un augment de l'accés al transport es correlaciona amb un 
augment del clúster Partit Demòcrata. 
Paraules Clau: comportament electoral, ordenació geogràfica, agrupació partidista, polarització, trànsit massiu, 
planificació urbana, impactes del disseny geoespacial, elecció general dels EUA 2012 
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I. Introduction 
Many scholars have observed the clustering of Americans into homogenous partisan 
communities (Bishop 2009; Gimpel 2013; Lang & Pearson-Merkowitz 2015).  This trend, 
similar to the polarization of the electorate, is seen as troublesome within democratic political 
discourse as legislative districts become homogenous clusters of partisans and ultimately 
unrepresentative.  Of interest to scholars and policy makers might be how to address this 
phenomenon.  Some scholars have found evidence to suggest that the phenomenon is caused 
in part by structural attributes such as infrastructure design (Nall 2015).  By comparing the 
extent to which metropolitan regions throughout the US have or have not developed public 
transit systems to connect peripheral areas to urban centers we can observe to what extent 
access to public transportation has stymied the geographic sorting of the American electorate 
into partisan communities.  
Transit systems cost a lot of money and thus require a significant amount of political will.  
States, cities, and counties must often cooperate with federal politicians and officials in order 
to raise the required revenue.  Mass transit systems have been advocated for a variety of 
reasons: to combat the carbon emissions of personal vehicles, to decrease commute costs to 
and from job centers, to increase physical activity for health systems burdened by obesity, 
and to reclaim valuable public and private space that is often reserved for parking and 
personal vehicle use.  These aspirations are mutually beneficial, but if it is found that public 
transportation access increases the vote share of one party over another then politicians will 
have incentive to oppose public transit expansion into their districts in order to keep their 
seats safe from competition.  These incentives would be expected to contribute to a feedback 
loop of ever increasing partisan clustering in a system like that of the US where politicians 
choose their voters through redistricting and gerrymandering.  This study does not find 
support for the ability of public transit use to decrease partisan clustering, but instead finds 
some support for the hypothesis that increases in transportation access correlate to an increase 
in Democratic partisan clustering.  Additionally, this study finds support for the claim made 
by social interaction theory that increases in space for social interaction cause political 
participation to have a tolerance inducing effect as observed by reduced partisan spatial 
segregation. 
5 . 
Measuring partisan clustering is often measured by either comparing the vote differential 
or vote share of the Democratic and Republican parties at the lowest geographical level 
available, with greater differentials suggesting greater sorting.  This study will measure 
partisan clustering by using the 2012 presidential election vote share in calculating the 
dissimilarity value of each county in relation to the state—a measure commonly used to 
measure segregation by comparing a smaller geographic unit’s demographics to an 
aggregated unit’s demographics, but which has also been used to measure partisan clustering 
(Walker 2013; Wong 2003).  This dissimilarity value will show how clustered a county is in 
comparison to the state in which it resides.  A check on the robustness of this variable will be 
done in the appendices of this paper to compare the results to national vote share dissimilarity 
and vote differentials.  By applying intergroup contact theory, urban theory, social capital 
theory, and class voting theory this research will seek to explain how transportation access 
might contribute to partisan clustering.  
This article will begin by laying out the theoretical framework for the analysis of partisan 
clustering in the USA, and then hypothesize how it relates to transportation access.  The 
following section will then summarize the methods and data that will be used, concluding 
with an analysis of the data, and a discussion of the primary findings. 
 
II. Background 
2.1.   Is there Partisan Clustering in the US? 
Partisan clustering, known in other terms as geographic sorting or partisan spatial 
segregation, is the phenomenon where people live in homogenous communities that reflect 
their beliefs and political ideology.  This occurrence has great importance in the American 
electoral system, as it would in other electoral systems of majoritarian single member 
districts, because of the ability to draw district lines so that a community can lie within either 
a competitive or non-competitive district.  This phenomenon is also not restricted to the US 
for countries all around the world—and in particular Britain and its former colonies—
demonstrate that left wing partisans are much more concentrated in small urbanized spaces 
then are right wing partisans (Rodden 2010).  In the US as a cause of the redistricting process 
nearly 87% of US House seats in the 2018 elections are already predicted to be safe from 
competition (The Cook Report 2017).  Researchers disagree about whether these 
communities are sought out by individuals seeking competitive or safe partisan districts—and 
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thus created by the intention of individual actors to self-segregate—, if they are caused by 
structural factors that favor certain groups of people living in certain areas, or if they are 
created by politicians themselves in the redistricting process. 
The topic of partisan clustering in the US received a boost of attention after the 
publication of Bishop’s The Big Sort (2009).  In it the author argues that the intentional 
migration of individuals into communities with similar political beliefs explains the reduction 
seen in competitive districts in the past few decades.  Since its publication Bishop’s work has 
spawned many empirical studies primarily on the hypothesis that partisan migration to 
likeminded communities is the cause of increased partisan clustering.  This is an intuitive 
argument based on the assumption that voters supporting the minority party in a district will 
seek out representation in districts where their party has a chance of winning and representing 
them, however this assumes that most of the migration contributing to the phenomenon is 
from voters with high political knowledge who place high importance on politics.  Some have 
found empirical evidence in support of this partisan migration hypothesis (Motyl, et al 2012; 
Gimpel, et al 2013; Sussel 2013; Lang & Pearson-Merkowitz 2015), while others have found 
evidence against it suggesting instead that relocation creates partisan clusters because those 
who identify with one party place higher importance on certain structural attributes of a place 
than do those who identify with another party (Mummolo & Nall 2017).  Nonetheless, the 
observations of the American electorate as sorted geographically appear to be unchallenged 
by both supporters and opponents of the partisan migration hypothesis and thus still open to 
causal explanation.  This research will focus on structural explanations for the observance of 
partisan clustering. 
In the study of partisan clustering the assumption might come across that communities 
that vote in unison are somehow undesirable.  Ideas and ideologies are not required equal 
representation in democratic republics but rather it is each voter and their ideas which are.  
Political diversity then in itself is not necessarily a goal nor a benefit, but an expected 
outcome of some theories of voting when community demographics are diverse.  If class and 
social cleavages are not reflected in the vote share of a diverse community then a more likely 
explanation might be due to the party system in question not representing traditional 
cleavages.  In the case of the US this is likely part of the explanation because of the presence 
of only two major parties both of which could be considered catch-all parties, and no 
traditional class based parties exist.  Nonetheless social cleavages are still used with accuracy 
to explain the vote, with middle and high income, Christian, rural and suburban white voters 
7 . 
consistently being shown to identify with the Republican party, while educated, low income, 
urban, and minority voters shown to identify with the Democratic party (Manza & Brooks 
1999).  With this understanding of class voting and social cleavage voting theories we can see 
that there are cleavages that each party represents and would expect to see their support 
reflected in the vote proportionate to the presence of these cleavages.  If class voting theory is 
applicable in this context then we would expect to observe a correlation between the presence 
of services used by one class more than another—public transit, and affordable housing, for 
instance—and support for their “class party”. 
2.2.   Theoretical Framework 
A mechanism to explain the political divisions observed between communities with 
access to public transportation and those without is that public transit increases the Social 
Interaction Potential (SIP) of a community.  SIP is a measure of a community based on the 
presence of spatial design features that foster interaction with others (Farber & Li 2013).  In 
this metric communities with low population density, few pedestrian walkways and heavy 
reliance on single occupancy vehicle transport would have a low SIP score; while 
communities with high population density, generous pedestrian walkways and high public 
transit use will have higher SIP scores.  Given that public transportation is an indicator for the 
metric its existence in a community would likely increase a SIP score even in a community 
with low density like America’s exurbs (Farber & Li 2013; Currie & Stanley 2003).  Little 
research using SIP scores has been done but measuring its correlation to that of the 
geographic distribution of partisan sorting can be an interesting test for its application as a 
mechanism. 
Public transportation access as a conduit of social interaction then acts as a bridge for 
social capital to cross community lines and strengthen ties and contribute to a beneficial 
mutual understanding of the other, whereby other forms of social capital derived from insular 
communities might increase social exclusion of others (Currie & Stanley 2003).  
Communities without public transportation access would then be expected to have low 
turnout rates where there is a presence of socially excluded outsiders—such as non-
partisans—who are not in a position to migrate to locations more similar to them.  This would 
then be compounded by the nature of the first past the post single district electoral system and 
gerrymandering for US house seats, as well as the construct of non-competitive winner take 
all states for the presidential election.  
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The effect that social interaction could have on partisanship is still contested.  Social 
capital theories might argue that the absence of social interaction is alienating, 
disempowering, and feeds into divergence of political opinions through self-selected publics 
(Putnam 2001; Stolle & Rochen 1998).  This would suggest that with less public 
transportation—and thereby less social interaction—communities would either be more 
polarized or homogenous through self-selection.  Other theories on how social interaction can 
affect partisanship have found context dependent results showing that views are more likely 
to be moderated when confronted by dissonant opinions more so when those views are in a 
minority position to a majority dissonant position (Huckfeldt 1987).  Other theories, such as 
Contact Theory and Urban Theory, still point to and even advocate for face-to-face 
intergroup interaction as a way to create tolerant communities (Wessel 2009; Fainstein 2005).  
In areas with high political, economic, and ethnic diversity public transit’s ability to increase 
social interaction by forcing commuters and travelers to confront inhabitants outside of their 
isolated and segregated communities rather than driving through them should then effect 
transit users’ political views of non-partisans.  However increases of low-quality interactions 
with others outside one’s community could also have the effect of decreasing social capital 
and thus one might expect to see even greater geographic clustering (Putnam 2007).   
Allport’s “intergroup contact theory” specifies that in order for contact to have a 
beneficial or tolerance inducing effect contacts need to have “equal status”, “common goals”, 
and “support from authorities or custom” (Pettigrew 1998, p.67).  Recent research suggests 
that support from an authority figure for the mediating behavior is even more important in 
today’s current context due to increased polarization and partisan sorting making norms 
formation a highly partisan issue (Dyck & Pearson-Merkowitz 2014).  Assuming that both 
parties in the US have equal ability to attract tolerant independent voters with vocal 
mediating figureheads then we would expect to find of these results that transportation access 
correlates with competitive races with a low vote differential.  Thus, deriving from the 
theories related to social capital and intergroup contact the first hypothesis of this research 
will be: 
H1:  Communities with greater access to public transportation will have lower 
partisan clustering, having a lower vote differential. 
Due to social capital theory’s findings on how interaction might increase political 
participation, there would appear to be an interactive effect between transit access and 
9 . 
political participation.  Higher levels of transit would increase social capital which would 
decrease partisan clustering, in relation to effective social interaction boosting political 
participation.  An interactive model would then be necessary to test this hypothesis. 
H2.1 :  The marginal effect of public transportation access on partisan clustering will 
be positive when values of political participation are at their lowest levels, and 
negative when values of political participation are at their highest levels.  
This interactive hypothesis comes from the assumptions that with higher transit use the social 
interaction experienced on transit will increase political participation through social capital 
building having an overall marginal effect to decrease partisan clustering.  The other part of 
this hypothesis assumes that higher levels of political participation in a community will 
interact with increased transit use to have a marginal effect in the direction of reducing 
partisan clustering.  This naturally then produces a second prediction on how these variables 
might interact with transportation access acting as the intervening variable and political 
participation as the main independent variable:1 
H2.2:  The marginal effect of political participation on partisan clustering will be 
positive when transportation access is at its lowest values, and negative when 
transportation access is at its highest values. 
If instead one party more than another represents tolerance and diversity then that party 
would be expected to benefit from a large vote differential where transit access is highest.  
Assuming, based on sorting or elite polarization theories, that the GOP has become the party 
of conservative ideology—which is one “associated with stereotyping prejudice, intolerance, 
and hostility toward a wide variety of outgroups”—then we would instead expect to find 
evidence in support of a hypothesis that the differential would increase to the benefit of the 
Democratic party where public transit is accessible (Jost et al. 2009, p.325).  A theoretical 
framework to support a hypothesis where transportation access increases Democratic party 
clustering would then need to be developed.  
Before developing the theoretical framework behind how transit access might affect 
Democratic party clustering it is important to state that county and state governments have an 
interest in maintaining unity across rural-urban divides and they do this by connecting 
                                                            
1 Testing an interactive hypothesis from both sides of the interaction allows for a clearer understanding of how 
an interaction behaves.  Refer to: (Berry, Golder & Milton 2012) 
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residents of all areas and income to employment and opportunity through infrastructure 
projects so as not to encourage breakaway states.  Car ownership and highway projects are 
one way used to provide access to employment opportunities, but the costs make it out of 
reach for many.  Nall (2015) found that the funding of the Interstate Highway program 
created suburban communities that favored wealthier residents with the ability to afford 
automobile ownership expenses, leading to Republican party clustering in communities with 
freeway access.  On the other hand Glaeser, et al (2003) found that access to public 
transportation made living in central urban areas affordable for the poor, even when housing 
was not as affordable.  In terms of causal mechanisms Nall’s (2015) and Glaeser et al’s 
(2003) mechanism can be summed up as greater income diversity allows for greater political 
diversity and by extension more competition in suburban communities. Others have also 
noted the potential of public transit to increase the wealth of those communities with access 
to it, which could contradict or complicate the hypotheses presented here (Banerjee et al 
2012).  
In 2017 Mummolo and Nall released a study which found support for the structural 
explanation for partisan clustering.  In this study the authors surveyed self-identified 
Democrats and Republicans and asked them to rate how important features of a given 
community would be in deciding whether or not to move there.  There were some features 
which obviously Democrats and Republicans placed equal importance on—such as a 
community’s safety, access to employment, climate, proximity to family, and school 
quality—, but there were other community features that one party seemed to cherish much 
more than the other when choosing a place in which to relocate.  Democratic survey 
respondents were found to place greater importance on a community’s access to low-income 
services, neighborhood walkability, proximity to metropolitan areas, and public transit 
quality.  Republican respondents on the other hand ranked community wealth, taxes, and big 
houses much higher in importance than Democratic respondents.  The explicit partisan 
migration question as to whether it mattered that their neighbors share their political views 
was also asked in the survey and was ranked equally low by both Republican and Democratic 
respondents (Mummolo & Nall 2017). The purpose of testing for the geographic clustering of 
partisans in this way is that it tries to take into account that clustering might not be intentional 
but accidental due to partisans selecting communities to live in that non-partisans wouldn’t 
care for.  This method however has lower internal validity because it does not explicitly stick 
to a minimalist understanding of agent driven partisan clustering, but can be useful in 
11 . 
exploring the factors that incidentally cause and replicate the phenomenon.  If their findings 
are accurate then we should expect to find more Democratic party voters where public transit 
accessibility and ridership is high.  This insight then leads into the third hypothesis of this 
study: 
H3:  Communities with greater access to public transportation will be observed to 
have greater Democratic party clustering  
However it must also be noted that although there is a noticeable difference in how 
important this issue is between partisans of each respective party, a lower proportion of the 
sample population finds these issues important for community selection overall when 
compared to other community characteristics like location, orderliness neighborhood income, 
and government (Mummolo & Nall 2017).  This should cause for a reduced effect overall by 
transit access on partisan clustering.  In order to accurately measure this effect other variables 
that also diverge in importance for community selection along partisan lines should also be 
taken into account and controlled for.   
There is also the possibility that public transit access increases housing costs and real 
estate values (Banerjee et al 2012) which would then be expected to decrease the effect of 
transportation access on class voting and class clustering because Republicans place more 
importance to real estate prices and neighborhood wealth than do Democrats (Mummolo & 
Nall 2017).  This effect would then again be mediated according to the extent to which 
having higher housing costs is offset by transportation costs and quality (Glaeser et al 2008).  
This theory combined with class theory and social cleavage voting theories suggests that 
there might be an interactive relationship between housing and transit costs and transit access.  
An interactive hypothesis would then need to be generated. 
H4.1:  The marginal effect of transportation access on Democratic partisan 
clustering will be positive when housing and transit costs are at their lowest values, 
and negative when housing and transit costs are at their highest values. 
The interactive hypothesis above is based on the assumption that the affordability of housing 
and transit options will mediate the effect transportation access has on Democratic party 
segregation.  Low affordability would then likely create a negative marginal effect from 
transit access increases on Democratic partisan clustering.  This hypothesis then produces a 
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second prediction on how these variables might interact with the variable’s roles in bringing 
about an effect switched:2 
H4.2:  The marginal effect of housing and transit costs on Democratic partisan 
clustering will be negative across all values of transportation access.  When 
transportation access is at its lowest values the marginal effect will be strongest and 
most negative, and when transportation access is at its highest values the marginal 
effect will be at its weakest. 
 
III.   Research Design 
3.1.   Unit Of Analysis 
The Unit of Analysis will be all of the 1,800 US counties that are located in the Census 
Bureau’s Core Based Statistical Areas which combines together counties that have strong 
economic and cultural links to a core metropolitan area.  Using counties as the unit of 
observation was largely influenced by the precedent set in Nall’s 2015 study on highway 
access and partisan clustering.  The counties selected show great variation in the presence of 
the independent variable and the dependent variable so could be said to be using the method 
of difference in case selection, however the selection was primarily driven by data 
availability for the independent variables.  The Housing and Transportation Affordability 
Index (H+T Index)—the source of data for the independent variables in this study—provides 
information for these counties (The Center for Neighborhood Technology 2016).  By 
selecting counties in CBSAs there should be an expected amount of commuting from central 
and outlying counties to metropolitan centers which should be reflected in the public 
transportation access data.  As the county level is smaller than both the state and CBSA levels 
this should help to show any spatial differences that might vary with partisan clustering.   
The county level as a unit of analysis is not the most ideal due to the wide variation 
between counties on the basis of size and population.  For example, the least populous is 
McPherson County, Nebraska with just 382 estimated inhabitants in 2013, while the most 
populous being Los Angeles County, California with over 9 million inhabitants.  By land area 
there is also significant variation: from Falls Church County, Virginia with just 5.14 square 
                                                            
2For more on the logic behind making two prediction for each interaction refer to: (Berry, Golder & Milton 
2012) 
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kilometers of land, to San Bernardino, California with nearly 52,000 square kilometers of 
land.  These large variations in the characteristics of the unit of analysis can be cause for 
some major problems.  Much variation that could be observed within these large counties will 
go unnoticed and lost into the aggregate means and medians of the county as a whole, being 
blotted out by the more densely populated centers of the county.  At this point there is also a 
regional difference in county land size, with counties in the eastern half of the US having 
much smaller land area than those in the western half of the US.  This difference is likely a 
cause of the West’s late development of a county system, lower population densities, and 
topographic differences caused by the presence of mountains and deserts.  The result of this 
regional difference means that observations from eastern counties will be more reflective of 
the population due to less variability possible with a smaller population and less land area to 
provide transit services, while observations from the western states will be less reflective due 
to increased variability within the county.   
Another issue with using counties as the unit of analysis is the crisscross of legislative 
districts between and within counties.  These governing bodies have significant control over 
spending decisions that might impact the presence of accessible transit in their counties, as 
well as which voters they want in their districts through redistricting and gerrymandering.  
The variation between districts will go largely unobserved in using county level data.  
However, a benefit remains by using county data over districts in that legislative districts are 
constantly changing shape to the extent that a cause and effect of transit access on partisan 
clustering could not be attributed to district legislative representation because public transit 
deals could have been made months or years before when that county was part of an entirely 
different district with different legislative representation.  So, by sticking to counties for 
observation some historical linearity can at least be inferred through the data even when the 
analysis is of just one year because of the consistent boundaries of the county. 
Ideally this research would be done using an even smaller unit of analysis, which does 
happen to be available for the independent variable.  However, data at lower units are not 
freely available for all cases under consideration.  Alternatively, smaller units could be 
observed if one restricts their scope to a handful of case studies, whereby there is no doubt 
excellent data is being published at the local level for local political office, but then one 
encounters the particular issues of observing state and local elections where voter turnout is 
greatly reduced to the point that it might skew interpretation of partisan clustering (Hajnal & 
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Lewis 2003; Marschall et al 2011).  For these reasons, this study will use the county level for 
analysis.  
3.2.    The Dependent Variables: Partisan Clustering 
The operationalization of partisan clustering is more complicated than that of the 
independent variables.  Measuring the geographic clustering of partisans would ideally be 
done by attaining the political attitudes at a level as small as neighborhoods.  The level of 
political homogeneity of communities would then ideally be measured by surveys of political 
ideology along a left-right scale, or level of partisan identification.  This would best take into 
account and hold for the regional differences observed in the US, where conservatives voting 
for a Republican candidate in one part of the state might be liberals who vote for a 
Democratic candidate in another (Feinberg et al 2017).  In this case the American National 
Elections survey would be ideal by selecting responses only from those zip codes of interest.  
However, the ANES survey along with the American Community Survey and others like it 
cannot be used either because there are too few responses per unit of analysis, or because of 
data restrictions on geographic indicators of respondents.  Voter registration data would be 
another possibility to measure partisan clustering, but many states do not require voters to 
register with a party so would not be comparable across all units.  Without sufficient 
resources to dispatch a survey nor current data availability at such a level of analysis election 
returns become the next best option for operationalizing the dependent variable.   
  This then leads to the next issue as to whether partisan clustering would be measured 
best with presidential election returns, or congressional election returns.  Using the 
presidential election results at the county level (McGovern & Larson 2017) avoids the 
problem of low voter turnout as caused by gerrymandered districts and second-order 
elections, which should then give a less biased picture of the partisan makeup of a county.  
The two common methods of measuring partisan clustering are either through using the vote 
share of a single party in a presidential election, or the vote differential between the two 
parties.  The vote differential has the benefit of describing the direction of partisan clustering 
through negative and positive values.  This measure would be calculated by subtracting the 
Republican party’s percentage of the vote share from the Democratic party’s percentage of 
the vote share.  For example, a 50-50 split in the 2012 vote for president in a county would 
mean a vote differential of 0, suggesting that there is no partisan sorting in that county.  On 
the other hand, a county with 80 percent of the electorate voting for the Republicans and 25 
15 . 
percent voting for the Democratic candidate would then have a vote differential of -55, 
reflecting a potentially Republican party sorted county.  This scale is one with 201 possible 
values, including zero, ranging from -100 to +100.  For the first hypothesis this directional 
component of the differential is not desirable, and so the absolute value of the differential 
would need to be used instead, which would be calculated by taking the square root of the 
squared vote differential.  In the previous example the county that had a -55 vote differential 
in the Republican direction would simply be considered as sorted to the value of 55 out of 
100 in the test for Hypothesis 1. 
Using the vote differential is useful but doesn’t operationalize the concept of partisan 
clustering as well as we would like.  In particular, the vote differential does not answer the 
question of whether a county is clustered in relation to the region, the state or the nation.  
This is an important distinction to make because a county that appears clustered by an 
absolute vote differential value of 40, for example, might be located in a state where the vote 
differential is also 40 meaning that the county is representative of the state and not clustered 
at all.    By calculating the Dissimilarity value of the vote share, a measure often used to 
identify levels of segregation in a geographic area, some scholars have addressed this 
problem (Walker 2013).  In this research the dissimilarity value will be calculated by taking 
the vote share of the Democratic party candidate in proportion to the vote share of that 
candidate at the state level and then subtracting that value by the vote share of the Republican 
candidate at the county level in proportion to the Republican vote share at the state level.  
Equations 1 and 2 below show the calculations for the dissimilarity directional values (1) and 
absolute values (2):    
D = ଵ
ଶ
 ∑ (௔
஺
െ ௕
஻
)     (1) 
     (2) 
Where ai and bi are the partisan populations of the unit under analysis—measured by the 
county level vote share—and A and B are the partisan populations in the population as a 
whole—measured through the vote share at the state level (Walker 2013; Wong 2003).  In 
order to check for the robustness of this indicator the dissimilarity value in relation to the 
national vote share can also be calculated for robustness checks at the end of the paper.  This 
then provides us with an indicator that can be measured with 201 possible values from -100 
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to +100, much like the vote differential.  This indicator (equation 1) can also be converted 
into an absolute value (the scalar value, equation 2) through the same calculation as used for 
the vote differential to test Hypothesis 1.  The histograms in figure 3.2.1 show the 
distributions of the six dependent variables to be used in this research.    
   
   
Figure 3.2.1 histograms of the dependent variable indicators with the ideal normal distribution lines 
superimposed.  The top 3 distributions are the vector indicators, and the bottom three are the scalar indicators. 
The left-most graphs are distributions from the Dissimilarity value calculated with state 2012 vote totals, the 
center two graphs are Dissimilarity values calculated from the national averaged vote totals for the 2008, 2012, 
and 2016 elections, while the two right-most graphs are distributions of the vote differential for 2012.  
 The interpretation of the Dissimilarity score changes between the normal directional 
and absolute value versions.  In the absolute value D represents the percent of a community’s 
population that would need to relocate in order to proportionately reflect the partisan makeup 
of the larger community—in the case of the left-most indicators in Figure 3.2.1 the larger 
community is the state, while in the case of the center variable this is the country as a 
whole—but does not suggest which partisan population would need to relocate.  In the vector 
version of the Dissimilarity score, D represents twice the percent of the population that would 
need to relocate in order to reflect the state or national partisan makeup, and then shows who 
would need to do the relocating: if D is negative than there are more Republican voters 
represented in the county than in the state or national electorate, while if D is positive than 
there are too many Democratic voters represented in the county than in the state or national 
electorate.  These distributions of the dependent variable indicators also show a skew of 
counties towards Republican clustering.   
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Using the presidential election at the county level also runs into problems with the 
possibility of leadership effects biasing the observation of partisanship at the community 
level.  One way to address this could be to average out the three most recent elections’ vote 
differentials and vote shares at the county levels in order to get a more accurate 
representation of partisanship beyond leadership effects.  Because the H+T Index data to be 
used for measuring the independent variable represents the single year of 2013 the 
presidential election results of 2008, 2012, and 2016 could then be used to ascertain the 
partisan makeup of a community.  This average vote differential and dissimilarity value will 
then be used to check for the robustness of the variables at the end of the article.3   
3.3.The Independent Variable: Public Transportation Access 
Public transportation access can be described as: the affordability of transit, a 
community’s proximity to transit stops and destinations, the time to get between city center 
and exurban periphery, and the frequency of transit.  Finding a single variable that 
encompasses all these aspects can be difficult.  Transit ridership will be used as the primary 
indicator for measuring transit accessibility, for it can be assumed that in order for there to be 
high ridership transit would have to be reachable, affordable, and have competitive trip times 
to other forms of transportation.  Transit ridership does not offer as accurate a picture of 
transit accessibility as might multiple indicators, but it does have the benefit of being a 
succinct one in all indicator.  Where ridership alone cannot explain variation other control 
variables may be introduced. 
The data for transit ridership was compiled by the Center for Neighborhood Technology’s 
H+T Index by aggregating data from the National Transit Database and the American 
Community Survey from their geographic coordinates (Center for Neighborhood Technology 
2017).  The group behind the dataset, the Center for Neighborhood Technology, is an 
nongovernmental organization that advocates for public transit and sustainable urban design.   
This dataset provides ridership information from each county’s transportation departments 
into a measure of annual transit trips per year for the regional typical household.  Another 
measure, which is arguably more relevant to this research, is the percent of all commute trips 
by public transit in a county.  These two indicators, however, have significant skewness 
issues (see Figure 3.3.1):   
                                                            
3 Refer to Appendix B for further explanations of the data used for the dependent variable and their means, 
standard deviations, and min/max values 
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Figure 3.3.1 The original data distribution from the Housing and Transportation affordability index shows a 
significant rightward skew; the ideal normal distribution line has been superimposed. 
To address this the independent variables have been logged transformed.  This 
successfully created a log-normal distribution of the independent variables, however it should 
be cautioned that interpretation of this data has now been changed from a linear model to a 
linear-log model (Benoit 2011). 
Yi = α + βilogXi + εi 
log X + 1 = log X + log e = log(eX)   (3) 
This means that in the following regressions that the coefficient for the independent variable, 
transportation access, will be expected to have a subsequent effect on the dependent 
variable—partisan clustering—when transportation access increases by e or by 172%, instead 
of the normal regression interpretation of a 1 unit change (Benoit 2011).   
  
Figure 3.3.2 Log transformation of the independent variable indicators with ideal normal distribution line 
superimposed (many observations were dropped due to zero values) 
This transformation was effective and worked nicely with following regressions, however 
that was only because it dropped a quarter of the data because its value was zero and the log 
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of zero is incomputable.  By using a log transformation and adding 1 to each value in the 
dataset for the independent variables these zero values can be retained and reflected in the 
dataset (se Figure 3.3.3): 
  
Figure 3.3.3 log(x+1) transformations of the independent variable indicators with ideal normal distribution line 
superimposed. 
The log(x+1) variables will be used for the subsequent regression analyses in this article.  
With these variables in the model the interpretation of the coefficients changes somewhat 
from the prior linear-log model: 
Yi = α + βlog(Xi+1)+ εi 
log (X+1) + 1 = log (X+1) + log e = log(e(X+1))  (4) 
This linear-log model will be interpreted as: the coefficient, β, represents a change in Y 
when X+1 is multiplied by e, or 2.72.  In order to measure how much of a change in Y a one 
unit change in X makes the β coefficient would then need to be divided by 2.72 and then have 
1 subtracted from it.  The final transformations of both independent variables have a much 
more normal distribution than both the original and log transformed data sets, and so are 
apparently best suited for regression analysis.   
In choosing the independent variable for measuring transportation accessibility there is a 
tradeoff.  On one hand the best variable for understanding the effects on the dependent 
variable is the one that measures the percent of commutes that use public transit because of 
the simplicity of interpreting a one percent increase in transit use and a subsequent effect on 
partisan clustering.  However, this variable has a much less normal distribution due in part to 
the original dataset rounding all the decimal percentages to the nearest whole number.  The 
second independent variable that can be used does not suffer from this drawback and has a 
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much more normal distribution, but is much more difficult to interpret because it is not a 
percentage but rather the county median income household’s average number of public transit 
trips in a year.  This means that in interpreting the coefficients in subsequent regression tables 
the increase in x that causes y is a meager 1 trip increase in a year.  This has much less 
meaning, and so the percentage of commute trips taken by transit will be the primary 
independent variable.  When necessary the annual transit trips variable will then be used as a 
robustness check on regressions made with the percentage of mass transit commute trips 
indicator. 
The other independent variables that will be used are those which will test the interactive 
hypotheses of Hypotheses 2 and 4.  In Hypothesis 2 the predicted interaction will be between 
transportation access and political participation.  The way that political participation will be 
measured in this article is through the voter turnout for the county in the 2012 election.  There 
are other ways that are perhaps more significant in representing levels of political 
participation for social capital theorists, but the easiest way for the unit of analysis chosen is 
through the voter turnout.  The next choice is whether to measure the voter turnout of 
registered voters or eligible voters.  Using registered voters as the total population of voters 
might unfortunately skew the data to make it seem that there is higher turnout than there 
actually is.  For example, a registered voter population could be half that of the voting age 
population and all turnout to vote, which would make that county’s turnout rate 100 percent 
when in actuality 50 percent of the electorate abstained.  By measuring the voting age 
population turnout the theorized covariation between turnout and partisan clustering caused 
by gerrymandering, partisan and swing states can be observed.  The voter turnout was 
calculated by taking the total votes made for president in the 2012 election and dividing it by 
the Citizen Voting Age Population estimated by the US Census Bureau (2012). 
The independent variable indicator to be used to test Hypothesis 4 will have to measure 
the affordability of transportation and housing.  By using the proprietary measurement of the 
Housing and Transportation Index dataset, the H+T index, this should be the most effective 
means of measurement (Center for Neighborhood Technology 2017).  The H+T index is an 
indicator which takes the annual transportation and housing costs of the median income 
household, as a percentage of the median income.  This indicator is measured on a 0-100 
scale with 100 being a combined housing and transportation cost equal to 100 percent of the 
median income.  By measuring these costs as a percentage of the median income we are able 
to also control for variation of income that might make these costs look bigger than they 
21 . 
actually are.  The county level median income is a better measure than the national median 
income measure because in the partisan migration theoretical framework of Hypothesis 4 
potential households in search of a county to relocate to would likely factor in how much 
housing and transportation would cost not in comparison to what the salary they are currently 
making but in comparison to what they will be likely to make in their new job at the 
destination of relocation.  One issue with this indicator might be that the cost of 
transportation includes personal vehicle as well as public transportation costs.  This would 
seem to be a huge error since this article is focused on public transportation and not personal 
vehicle transport.  However, based on the theoretical framework presented earlier from Nall’s 
2015 results on how highway infrastructure caused Republican sorting due to the higher 
income required to maintain a personal vehicle it should be expected that areas with public 
transit access will have lower transportation and housing costs in turn (Glaeser et al 2008).  
These two independent variables just discussed will also be used in the models for testing the 
other hypotheses but in an additive control variable capacity only since there has not been a 
theoretical framework developed to justify putting them both in each models as interactions.4 
3.4.  Control Variables 
The control variable will be broken down into three categories.  The first set of variables 
will be those derived from the social capital theories and include those variable that are 
expected to effect social capital with changes in geospatial features.  These variables include 
annual vehicle miles traveled per household, and how compact the average neighborhood is.  
Measured on a 0 to 10 scale neighborhood compactness would be expected to effect 
walkability and social interaction potential, and suggests levels of urbanization and 
population density (Farber & Li 2013).  The second set of variables are the voter migration 
variables that would be expected to effect a partisan more than a non-partisan in their 
decisions to relocate.  The variables include housing and transportation costs, and proximity 
to jobs (Mummolo & Nall 2017).  The third grouping of variables represent demographic 
controls which are the most common explanation of the vote by class, origin, and partisan 
identity theories of voting.  These variables include percentage of non-white residents, 
median household income, percent of population with at least a bachelor’s degree, and 
percent of the county population below the national poverty line.  The final variable that will 
                                                            
4 Refer to Appendix B for further explanations of the independent and control variable’s means, standard 
deviations, and min/max values  
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be used for control purposes is a simple categorical variable that will be used to measure state 
fixed effects.  
3.5   Models for Hypothesis Testing 
In order to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 the absolute value of the dependent variable, partisan 
clustering, will have to be used.  Using the magnitude of the Dissimilarity value and the value 
of transportation access should test to see if there is evidence to support the hypothesis.  The 
following equations represent the models that will be used to test the hypotheses: 
H1:     | Partisan Clustering2012i | = β0 + βt log (Transit Accessi+1) + βcontrols + εi      (5) 
H2:     | Partisan Clustering2012i | = β0 + βt log (Transit Accessi+1) + βp Political Participation2012i     (6) 
+ β t p log (Transit Accessi+1) * Political Participation2012i + βcontrols + εi 
Support for the null hypothesis would come in the form of there being weak support for an 
increase in transit ridership covarying with a decrease in partisan clustering, or evidence of an 
inverse relationship.  The test for the interactive hypotheses, H2.1 and H2.2, is represented in 
equation 6.  As was stated earlier the county’s voter turnout in the 2012 election will be used 
to test the interaction. 
The main difference between the tests for Hypotheses 1 & 2, and Hypotheses 3 & 4 is 
that the dependent variable switches from an absolute value signifying only magnitude in 
Hypothesis 1, to a value able to signify the direction of the partisan sorting in Hypothesis 3 
(equation 7):   
H3:     Partisan Clustering2012i  = β0 + βt log (Transit Accessi+1) + βcontrols + εi       (7) 
H4:     Partisan Clustering2012i  = β0 + βt log (Transit Accessi+1) + βc (H+T Costs)i     (8) 
+ β t c log (Transit Accessi+1) * (H+T Costs) + βcontrols + εi 
The equation that will be used to test the interactive hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2 is represented in 
equation 8.  As mentioned before the indicator for housing and transit costs in the interaction 
test will be the H+T index. 
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IV.    Empirical Results 
4.1   Transit Access and Partisan Clustering 
To test the first hypothesis of this research on how transit access effects the magnitude of 
partisan clustering a regression analysis has been used.  Negative coefficients for the log of 
commutes by transit would have to be observed for the hypothesis to have sufficient evidence 
in its support.  
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
VARIABLES Absolute Value 
Dissimilarity 
Absolute Value 
Dissimilarity 
Absolute Value 
Dissimilarity 
Absolute Value 
Dissimilarity 
     
log(%transit commutes) 0.288 2.603** 0.581 8.531** 
 (0.667) (1.043) (1.109) (3.725) 
Voter Turnout  -0.0979** 0.304*** 0.410*** 
  (0.0401) (0.0652) (0.0807) 
Vehicle miles traveled/household  0.00148*** 0.000990*** 0.00101*** 
  (0.000229) (0.000255) (0.000255) 
Compact neighborhood score  1.948*** 2.148*** 2.151*** 
  (0.481) (0.576) (0.576) 
Job Access score  0.197 0.455 0.511 
  (0.369) (0.413) (0.413) 
Housing+Transit costs %  0.270*** 0.147** 0.140** 
  (0.0608) (0.0679) (0.0679) 
% Nonwhite voters   -0.102*** -0.113*** 
   (0.0376) (0.0379) 
County median income, % of Nat’l    0.0163 0.0202 
   (0.0389) (0.0389) 
% below poverty line   0.481*** 0.517*** 
   (0.154) (0.154) 
Education, % completed Bachelors   -0.227*** -0.217*** 
   (0.0676) (0.0677) 
     
log(% Transit Commutes)*Voter 
Turnout 
   -0.138** 
    (0.0619) 
     
State Fixed Effects:   YES YES 
     
Constant 23.22*** -29.11*** -33.20*** -40.37*** 
 (0.617) (8.198) (9.912) (10.41) 
     
Observations 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,801 
R-squared 0.000 0.037 0.195 0.198 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4.1.1 Models for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. The regression table with the bivariate model (1); 
multivariate additive models with: social interaction potential and relocation rational variables (2), and all 
variables (3); and the multivariate interactive model (4) 
As the results of Model 1 in table 4.1.1 suggest there is little support for transit access 
reducing partisan clustering, with the sign of the coefficient being positive rather than 
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negative, having a low magnitude, and statistical insignificance.  Model 1 shows that the 
effect of transit access on partisan clustering is statistically and substantively insignificant.  
Once the social capital and social interaction potential variables are controlled for (Model 2) 
the effects of transit access become more significant, but still in the opposite direction 
hypothesized.  It should also be noted that the direction of the constant switches after the 
controls are added from positive to negative.  In model 3 the coefficient for transportation 
access returns to insignificant levels with the sign of the coefficient remaining in the opposite 
direction suggested in Hypothesis 1. 
The annual vehicle miles traveled was as expected a strong effect on clustering, with a 
meager 30 mile round trip commute in a single occupancy vehicle equating to an annual 
vehicle miles traveled of 7,500 and a subsequent expected effect on the absolute value of 
dissimilarity to increase clustering by 7.5 percentage points for models 3, 4, and 5.  This was 
assumed through the social interaction potential theories.  The density effect (Compact 
neighborhood score), like the effect of transit access, do not appear to have the effect 
theorized under social interaction potential.  The demographic variables introduction into the 
models as well as the state fixed effects in models 3 and 4 have a substantial increase on 
explaining the variance observed as expected.  The transit access effect on the absolute value 
of partisan clustering explains much less of the variance observed.  However to better 
understand how transit access and political participation interact to produce and effect on 
partisan clustering a plot of the marginal effect will be needed and will test Hypothesis 2. 
 
Figure 4.1.1 The Average Marginal Effects plots of transit access on partisan clustering across values of voter 
turnout (H2.1; Left), and the marginal effect of voter turnout on partisan clustering across values of transit 
access(H2.2; Right).  Both plots are calculated from the regression in model 4 of Table 4.1.1. 
The marginal effects of transit access on partisan clustering can be seen to be positive at 
the lowest values of voter turnout, and negative at the highest values of voter turnout.  This is 
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as was predicted in Hypotheis 2.1, however this interaction is shown to be insignificant as the 
confidence intervals never really move from the zero marginal effect line.  The marginal 
effect of voter turnout on partisan clustering is also positive when transit access is low and 
negative when transit access is high.  However the marginal effect of the voter turnout on 
partisan clustering is shown to only have a partisan clustering effect below the log of transit 
access value of 1.669.  Above this value there is no statistical significance.  The direction of 
the interaction testing Hypothesis 2.2 suggests that there is some support that with higher 
levels of transit access the marginal effect of political participation on partisan clustering is 
moderated.  However the explicit prediction made in H2.2 that at higher levels of transit 
access the marginal effect of political participation on partisan clustering is negative is not 
shown here.  The margins plot in Figure 4.1.1 shows instead that higher levels of transit 
access only weaken—but not reverse—the positive marginal effect political participation has 
on partisan clustering.     
4.2   Transit access and Democratic Party Clustering 
 (Model 5) (Model 6) (Model 7) (Model 8) 
VARIABLES Democratic 
Dissimilarity 
Democratic 
Dissimilarity 
Democratic 
Dissimilarity 
Democratic 
Dissimilarity 
     
log(%transit commutes) 17.14*** 12.53*** 0.144 -9.543** 
 (0.965) (1.499) (1.082) (4.562) 
Housing+Transit costs %  0.0129 -0.300*** -0.450*** 
  (0.0874) (0.0662) (0.0952) 
     
Voter Turnout  0.276*** 0.331*** 0.347*** 
  (0.0576) (0.0636) (0.0640) 
Vehicle miles traveled/household  -0.00240*** -0.000226 -0.000349 
  (0.000329) (0.000249) (0.000255) 
Compact neighborhood score  0.0856 0.160 0.508 
  (0.691) (0.562) (0.584) 
Job Access score  -1.047** 0.576 0.419 
  (0.531) (0.403) (0.409) 
% Nonwhite voters   1.187*** 1.190*** 
   (0.0367) (0.0367) 
County median income, % of 
Nat’l  
  -0.261*** -0.264*** 
   (0.0380) (0.0379) 
% below poverty line   0.574*** 0.563*** 
   (0.150) (0.150) 
Education, % completed 
Bachelors 
  0.971*** 0.959*** 
   (0.0660) (0.0661) 
     
log(%transit commutes)*H+T 
costs % 
   0.177** 
    (0.0811) 
State Fixed Effects?   YES YES 
     
Constant -24.74*** 26.23** -44.77*** -33.70*** 
 (0.892) (11.78) (9.672) (10.91) 
     
Observations 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,801 
R-squared 0.149 0.191 0.689 0.689 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.2.1 Models for testing Hypotheses 3 and 4. The regression table with the bivariate model (5); 
multivariate additive models with: social interaction potential and relocation rational variables (6), and all 
variables (7); and the multivariate interactive model (8). 
The third hypothesis to be tested differs from the first hypothesis test in that for this test 
the directional variable for clustering will be used rather than the non-directional absolute 
value of the Dissimilarity value.  The hypothesis assumes that as transit access increases so 
does Democratic party clustering.  This will be observed through positive coefficients, while 
alternatively coefficients with negative signs suggest Republican clustering.   
Models 5 and 6 in the above table show significant positive coefficients for the effect of 
transportation access on Democratic partisan clustering.  This suggests that for every one unit 
increase in the log of the percent of commutes by transit that Democratic party clustering 
increases by more than 10 percentage points.  Using the dissimilarity value this means that 5 
percent of the population in the county would have to relocate to another county in order for 
the county to be said to have no clustering in comparison to the state’s partisan makeup.  In 
Model 7 after the introduction of the state fixed effects and demographic control variables—
which are more common for explaining reasons for the vote—the effect of transit access 
becomes insignificant in comparison.  However the sign on this insignificant coefficient 
retains the hypothesized direction and so could still be said to maintain some support for the 
second hypothesis.  The interactive model (8) with all the control variables still shows a 
statistically and substantively significant coefficient for both independent variables and their 
interactive term.  However the sign on the interactive model’s transportation access 
coefficient switches from the additive models (6 and 7).  To better understand the interactive 
relationship the margins plot in Figure 4.2.1 should be helpful.    
 
Figure 4.2.1 The Average Marginal Effects plots of transit access on partisan clustering across values of 
housing and transportation costs (H4.1; Left), and the marginal effect of housing and transportation costs on 
partisan clustering across values of transit access (H4.2; Right).  Both plots are calculated from the regression 
in model 8 of Table 4.2.1. 
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The Average Marginal Effects plots in figure 4.2.1 show the additional effect that the 
interactive term has on partisan clustering.  In the theoretical framework section of this paper 
Hypothesis 4.1 predicted that the marginal effect of transportation access on Democratic 
partisan clustering would be positive at low values of housing and transportation costs and 
negative at high values of housing and transportation costs.  This effect is not reflected in the 
evidence presented here.  Instead we observe the opposite, that at low values of housing and 
transportation costs there is a negative marginal effect by transportation access on 
Democratic partisan clustering and at high values of housing and transportation costs a 
positive effect.  This would suggest that places with lower housing and transportation costs 
would experience partisan clustering in the Republican party direction when transportation 
access increases rather than in the democratic clustering direction, but the plot shows that 
nowhere in the interaction plotted is the relationship statistically significant.  In the second 
margins plot showing the marginal effect of housing and transit costs on Democratic partisan 
clustering across values of transit access we can observe the predicted relationship from 
Hypothesis 4.2.  Here the marginal effect of housing and transportation costs on Democratic 
partisan clustering is negative for the values below the value of 1.6 of the log of transit 
ridership.  This effect is only observed to be positive when transportation access is at its 
highest but should not be trusted because the results above the 1.6 value of the log of transit 
access is not statistically significant.  This suggests that with lower transit ridership levels the 
additional effect of housing and transportation costs will have the effect of contributing to 
Republican partisan clustering, while at higher levels of transit access there will be a weaker 
additional effect towards Republican partisan clustering by housing and transit costs.  
The evidence presented in Figure 4.2.1 also goes against the relation between 
affordability, class theory and partisan clustering suggested by other researchers (Nall 2015; 
Glaesser et al 2008).  An alternative understanding of this interaction would support the 
notion that transit access causes cost increases (Bannerjee et al 2012) and that class voting 
does not explain the vote in the US contrary to theorists that still argue in support of it (Evans 
2000).  However it could still be argued that greater housing and transportation costs as a 
percentage of income reflect not the upper and middle class but a lower class and thus the 
Hypothesis 4.1 was wrong to predict that the marginal effect of transit access on Democratic 
partisan clustering would be negative when costs for housing and transportation costs are 
highest.  Overall the results presented here are too weak to support Hypothesis 4.1, yet 
provide some support for rejecting the null hypotheses of Hypotheses 3 and 4.2 .   
Mauro, R.  28 
 
4.3   Discussion 
The analysis provided in the previous sections test the hypotheses presented in this 
research.  The test for the first hypothesis found no support for the hypothesis that transit 
access decreases partisan clustering.  Ideally further research would be needed to provide 
further support, but there is not enough support to reject the null hypothesis.  The test of the 
Hypothesis 2.2 found some statistical and substantial support.  The predictions made of the 
interaction returned not exactly as expected that the marginal effect of transit access on 
partisan clustering is negative when political participation is higher, but did find a decrease in 
the strength of the positive marginal effect political participation can have on partisan sorting 
with higher transit access values.  This interaction highlights the social interaction and social 
capital building potential of transportation access. 
  The test for the third hypothesis as well found some support for the hypothesis that 
transit access increases democratic partisan clustering in the absence of certain controls, but 
that support weakened after controlling for more likely causes of Democratic partisan 
clustering.  This test found tentative support to reject the null hypothesis. 
  The test of Hypothesis 4.1 did not find statistical nor substantive support, and did not 
return as expected that the marginal effect of transit access on partisan clustering would be 
negative when housing and transportation costs are higher.  Part of this incorrect prediction 
could be from a misapplied theoretical framework, but also from improper operationalization 
of the affordability variable by using an indicator that included all transportation methods 
costs rather than just public transit costs. 
These tests were then checked for robustness using the alternative indicators discussed 
earlier on.  In summary, most of the results from these checks mirror the empirical results that 
were presented here.  The one notable, although minor, exception was that the robustness 
check for the test of Hypothesis 1 suggested greater support for the hypothesized relationship 
but likely not enough to reverse the conclusions already made of that hypothesis test.  The 
complete results, and some additional comments can be viewed in Appendix A.    
 
V.   Conclusion:   
This study does not find support for the ability of public transit use to decrease partisan 
clustering, but rather finds some support for the hypothesis that an increase in transportation 
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access correlates to an increase in Democratic partisan clustering.  This result corroborates 
the findings of prior researchers on how the structural incentives for relocation cause partisan 
clustering, rather than the self-segregation of partisans (Mummolo & Nall 2017; Nall 2015).  
These results however would seem to give incentive for the Republican party to oppose 
public transit access and to draw district boundaries in a way to isolate this element.  
However, the effects observed on Democratic partisan clustering should not be overstated for 
their impact is minimal in comparison to traditional explanations for partisan identity 
formation and voting behavior.   
  Additionally, this study finds minor support for the claim made by social interaction 
theory that increases in space for social interaction cause political participation to have a 
tolerance inducing effect (Pettigrew 1998; Farber & Li 2013).   This we observed in the H2.2 
test showing the marginal effect of political participation on partisan spatial segregation to 
decrease within a range of transit access increases.  Whether this effect was brought about 
primarily from social capital acting a bridge to foster intergroup contact in heterogenous 
communities, or whether it was a cause of homogenous communities increasing an insulated 
social capital through contact cannot be differentiated in this research (Currie & Stanley 
2003; Putnam 2007).  In actuality, the ability of transit riders to confront non-partisans and 
others of divergent backgrounds and views from their own is context dependent on the transit 
route having stops in and use by non-partisan communities.  Further research should be done 
with smaller units of analysis to thoroughly measure the extent of this interaction between 
transit ridership as a space for potential intergroup social interaction and political 
participation.  
How transit access effects partisan clustering is not a concept restricted to the USA.  
Further research should be done to see whether or not the effects of access to mass transit on 
partisan clustering is observed in a similar way outside the USA.  Findings would likely 
reflect the role of the electoral system in their outcomes, with countries with single member 
winner take all districts likely under similar pressures of the redistricting process, and 
countries with multi-member districts and proportional representation likely experiencing less 
partisan clustering associated with transit access.  An examination of partisan clustering in 
the rest of the world might bring further support for structural and electoral systems 
explanations for the observed phenomenon.   
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VII.   APPENDIX A: Robustness Checks 
7.1   Robustness checks for the H1 and H2 tests: 
Table R1: 
 (R1) (R2) (R3) (R4) (R5) 
VARIABLES Absolute Value 
Dissimilarity 
scalr_votediff_2012 scalr_votediff_2012 scalr_DvalueAvgnatl scalr_DvalueAvgnatl 
      
log(annual transit 
trips+1) 
0.0732  -1.262***  -3.630*** 
 (0.416)  (0.458)  (0.487) 
log(%transit 
commutes) 
 -1.119  -4.741***  
  (0.736)  (0.784)  
      
Constant 23.24*** 28.08*** 30.57*** 34.53*** 40.61*** 
 (1.155) (0.680) (1.272) (0.725) (1.351) 
Observations 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,801 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.020 0.030 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The above table shows results that provide support for Hypothesis 1, contrary to the results of 
the original hypothesis test (compare to Model 1 of table 4.1.1).  The coefficients here on transit 
access are all significant for the dependent variables calculated using the 2012 vote differential (R2 
and R3) and dissimilarity value of the average election results of 2008, 2012, and 2016, and are all the 
same sign hypothesized.  This could suggest that holding for leadership effects should have been used 
for the primary hypothesis testing, but could also be reflecting the difference between calculating the 
dissimilarity value with state totals verses national totals.  Model R1 reiterates the results from section 
4.1 that in relation to the state there is either insignificant support for H1 or significant support against 
H1 for transit access to decrease partisan clustering.  However Models R2-R4 suggest that there is 
significant support for transportation access to decrease partisan clustering.  It should be noted that 
there is little difference between the regression using the log of annual transit trips of the median 
income household and the log of the percent of commutes using transit.   
 Moving on to the multivariate models in R6-R7 we see that these results of the simple 
bivariate regression are no longer observed.  When controlling for all the variables the sign on the 
coefficient for transit access switches and no longer supports the first hypothesis.  These additive 
multivariate models should be compared along side Model 3 of Table 4.1.1, and the interactive model 
models (R9-R11) should be compared to Model 4 of Table 4.1.1.  In Models R9-R11 we see the same 
results observed in Table 4.1.1  The coefficients of the transit access and voter turnout variables, 
including the interactive coefficients, are all of a similar magnitude and direction.  Do to this 
similarity graphing the margins plot would be expected to produce the same results and is thus not 
necessary.  The results for H2 are shown to be robust.    
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Table R2: 
 (R6) (R7) (R8) (R9) (R10) (R11) 
VARIABLES scalr_DvalueAv
gnatl 
scalr_Dvalue201
2state 
scalr_votediff_
2012 
scalr_DvalueAv
gnatl 
Absolute 
Value 
Dissimilar
ity 
scalr_votediff_
2012 
       
log(%transit commutes) 5.789*** 0.581 4.936*** 11.10** 8.531** 11.31*** 
 (1.131) (1.109) (1.107) (4.382) (3.725) (3.722) 
avg_VoterTurnout08_16 -0.00411   0.0630   
 (0.0689)   (0.0873)   
Voter Turnout  0.304*** 0.217***  0.410*** 0.302*** 
  (0.0652) (0.0651)  (0.0807) (0.0806) 
       
Vehicle miles 
traveled/household 
8.16e-05 0.000990*** -6.18e-05 7.50e-05 0.00101*
** 
-4.66e-05 
 (0.000261) (0.000255) (0.000255) (0.000261) (0.000255
) 
(0.000255) 
Compact neighborhood score 3.325*** 2.148*** 3.060*** 3.316*** 2.151*** 3.063*** 
 (0.586) (0.576) (0.575) (0.586) (0.576) (0.575) 
Job Access score -2.040*** 0.455 -1.422*** -2.031*** 0.511 -1.377*** 
 (0.420) (0.413) (0.412) (0.420) (0.413) (0.413) 
Housing+Transit costs % 0.0167 0.147** 0.00860 0.0132 0.140** 0.00271 
 (0.0692) (0.0679) (0.0678) (0.0692) (0.0679) (0.0678) 
avg_nonwhiteCVAP -0.422***   -0.429***   
 (0.0385)   (0.0389)   
County median income, % of 
Nat’l  
0.0982** 0.0163 0.0725* 0.103** 0.0202 0.0756* 
 (0.0397) (0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0398) (0.0389) (0.0389) 
% below poverty line -0.0667 0.481*** 0.113 -0.0435 0.517*** 0.142 
 (0.157) (0.154) (0.154) (0.158) (0.154) (0.154) 
Education, % completed 
Bachelors 
-0.561*** -0.227*** -0.444*** -0.556*** -0.217*** -0.436*** 
 (0.0694) (0.0676) (0.0675) (0.0695) (0.0677) (0.0676) 
% Nonwhite voters  -0.102*** -0.268***  -0.113*** -0.277*** 
  (0.0376) (0.0376)  (0.0379) (0.0379) 
       
log(annual transit 
trips+1)*Voter Turnout 
      
       
log(%transit 
commutes)*Voter Turnout 
    -0.138** -0.111* 
     (0.0619) (0.0618) 
log(annual transit 
trips+1)*avg_VoterTurnout0
8_16 
      
       
log(%transit 
commutes)*avg_VoterTurno
ut08_16 
   -0.0891   
    (0.0710)   
       
State Fixed Effects? YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Constant 52.06*** -33.20*** 28.89*** 47.75*** -40.37*** 23.14** 
 (10.13) (9.912) (9.900) (10.70) (10.41) (10.40) 
       
Observations 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,801 
R-squared 0.407 0.195 0.341 0.408 0.198 0.342 
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7.2   Robustness checks for the H3 and H4 tests: 
Table R3: 
 (R12) (R13) (R14) (R15) (R16) 
VARIABLES Dvalue_2012DRstate vdifferentialDR_2012 vdifferentialDR_2012 Dvalue_avgDR_Natl Dvalue_avgDR_Natl 
      
log(%transit 
commutes) 
 24.46***  26.69***  
  (1.010)  (1.012)  
log(annual transit 
trips+1) 
10.60***  14.83***  16.25*** 
 (0.603)  (0.635)  (0.637) 
      
Constant -40.12*** -33.46*** -54.65*** -41.26*** -64.54*** 
 (1.673) (0.933) (1.763) (0.936) (1.768) 
      
Observations 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,801 
R-squared 0.147 0.246 0.233 0.279 0.266 
 In the above table (to be compared with the results of Model 5 in Table 4.2.1) the coefficients 
of models R12-R16 are all shown to be significant, and in the direction hypothesized.  There is shown 
to be little difference between the selection of the dependent or independent variable, so this simple 
bivariate test can be said to be robust.   
In the Table below the additive Models R17-R19 should be compared to Model 7 of Table 
4.2.1, and the interactive Models R20-R22 should be compared to Model 8 of Table 4.2.1.  All of the 
models of important coefficients in the model are similar in magnitude and direction to the 
coefficients presented in the regression for the second hypothesis test.  This suggests that the results 
reached in testing H3 and H4 are robust. 
 
 
Table R4: 
 (R17) (R18) (R19) (R20) (R21) (R22) 
VARIABLES Dvalue_avgDR_
Natl 
Dvalue_2012DR
state 
vdifferentialDR_
2012 
Dvalue_avgDR_
Natl 
Democrati
c 
Dissimilar
ity 
vdifferentialDR_
2012 
       
log(%transit commutes) -0.249 0.144 0.153 -13.24*** -9.543** -10.50** 
 (0.994) (1.082) (1.024) (4.184) (4.562) (4.314) 
Housing+Transit costs 
% 
-0.318*** -0.300*** -0.282*** -0.518*** -0.450*** -0.446*** 
 (0.0608) (0.0662) (0.0627) (0.0872) (0.0952) (0.0900) 
       
Voter Turnout  0.331*** 0.324***  0.347*** 0.342*** 
  (0.0636) (0.0602)  (0.0640) (0.0605) 
avg_VoterTurnout08_1
6 
0.479***   0.500***   
 (0.0606)   (0.0608)   
Vehicle miles 
traveled/household 
-0.000299 -0.000226 -0.000153 -0.000464** -0.000349 -0.000288 
 (0.000229) (0.000249) (0.000236) (0.000234) (0.000255
) 
(0.000241) 
Compact neighborhood 
score 
0.327 0.160 0.235 0.800 0.508 0.618 
 (0.515) (0.562) (0.532) (0.535) (0.584) (0.552) 
Job Access score 0.791** 0.576 0.626 0.580 0.419 0.454 
 (0.370) (0.403) (0.381) (0.375) (0.409) (0.387) 
avg_nonwhiteCVAP 1.183***   1.187***   
 (0.0338)   (0.0338)   
County median income, 
% of Nat’l  
-0.255*** -0.261*** -0.250*** -0.259*** -0.264*** -0.253*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0380) (0.0359) (0.0348) (0.0379) (0.0359) 
% below poverty line 0.628*** 0.574*** 0.562*** 0.611*** 0.563*** 0.549*** 
 (0.138) (0.150) (0.142) (0.138) (0.150) (0.142) 
Education, % 
completed Bachelors 
1.111*** 0.971*** 0.918*** 1.096*** 0.959*** 0.905*** 
 (0.0610) (0.0660) (0.0624) (0.0610) (0.0661) (0.0625) 
% Nonwhite voters  1.187*** 1.139***  1.190*** 1.142*** 
  (0.0367) (0.0347)  (0.0367) (0.0347) 
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log(%transit 
commutes)*Housing+T
ransit costs % 
   0.238*** 0.177** 0.195** 
    (0.0743) (0.0811) (0.0767) 
log(annual transit 
trips+1)*Housing+Tran
sit costs % 
      
       
       
State Fixed Effects? YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Constant -85.29*** -44.77*** -67.71*** -70.45*** -33.70*** -55.55*** 
 (8.910) (9.672) (9.151) (10.03) (10.91) (10.32) 
       
Observations 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,801 
R-squared 0.797 0.689 0.774 0.799 0.689 0.775 
 
 
VIII.   APPENDIX B: Data 
Variable Name Explanation Observ
-ations 
Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Dependent Variable Indicators: 
      
Democratic Dissimilarity 
(Dvalue_2012DRstate) 
 
the Dissimilarity value for the 2012 
election.  This is calculated using each 
party's percentage vote share in the 
county and their vote sharei in the state 
for the presidential election of 2012.  
1801 -12.41772 25.79552 -77.16631 93.06157 
Dvalue_2012DRNatl the Dissimilarity  value for the 2012 
election.  This is calculated using each 
party's percentage vote share in the 
county and their vote share for the 
national election 2012. In Excel the 
formula used was 
"=((1/2)*((BY2/51.06)-(CA2/47.2)))" 
1801 -20.11289 29.2206 -93.17394 81.921 
 Dvalue_avgDR_Natl  the Dissimilarity  value for the average of 
the 2008, 2012, and 2016 elections.  This 
is calculated using each party's average 
percentage vote share in the county and 
their average vote share for the national 
elections in the three presidential 
elections observed. In Excel the formula 
used was "=((1/2)*((CQ2/50.723)-
(CR2/46.313)))" 
1801 -22.06895 29.38336 -149.2118 84.51061 
 vdifferentialDR_2012 The 2012 presidential vote differential 
(calculated by subtracting the Republican 
candidate's vote share by the Democratic 
candidate vote shar) 
1801 -15.87005 28.66769 -87.52 84.24 
AVGppointdifferential An average of the 2008, 2012, and 2016 
presidential elections vote differentials 
1801 -16.94371 28.42697 -129.5033 86.29333 
Absolute Value Dissimilarity 
(scalr_Dvalue2012state) 
The absolute value of 
"Dvalue_2012DRstate" 
1801 23.42728 16.44846 0.050446 93.06157 
scalr_Dvalue2012Natl The absolute value of 
"Dvalue_2012DRNatl" 
1801 29.72973 19.34551 0.0179002 93.17393 
scalr_DvalueAvgnatl The absolute value of " 
Dvalue_avgDR_Natl " 
1801 31.1223 19.53343 0.0066109 149.2118 
scalr_votediff_2012 The absolute value of " 
vdifferentialDR_2012" 
1801 27.27515 18.15181 0.03 87.52 
scalr_votediff_avg The absolute value of 
"AVGppointdifferential" 
1801 27.83284 17.89536 0.0433333 129.5033 
       
Independent Variable Indicators: 
      
pct_transit_commuters_ami Transit Ridership % of Workers for the 
Regional Typical Household  
1801 1.620766 3.72111 0 64 
transit_trips_ami Annual number of Transit Trips for the 
regional typical household 
1801 22.59189 51.525 0 893 
log_transittrips2 log(x+1) transformation for right skew 
correction, for "transit_trips_ami" 
1801 2.614565 0.932181
4 
0 6.795706 
log(%transit commutes) 
(log_commuters2) 
log(x+1) transformation for right skew 
correction for 
"pct_transit_commuters_ami" 
1801 0.718864
9 
0.581177 0 4.174387 
logcommuters log transformation of % of commutes by 
public transit 
1356 0.396981
1 
0.654038 0 4.158883 
37 . 
logtransittrips log transformation of annual number of 
transit trips for the regional typical 
household 
1784 2.524008 1.002799 0 6.794587 
       
Interaction variables: 
      
 Voter Turnout The percentage of the Citizen Voting 
Age Population that turned out to vote in 
the 2012 presidential election based on 
estimates from the Census Bureau 
1801 57.30824 9.99002 17.35518 105.9649 
avg_VoterTurnout08_16  County average CVAP voter turnout for 
the presidential elections of 2008, 2012, 
and 2016 (percentages in over 100 could 
have been caused  by the rare 
underestimating  of population growth or 
retention for a county) 
1801 59.07124 9.364595 16.24518 119.1801 
Housing+Transit costs % 
(ht_ami) 
Housing + Transportation (personal and 
public transit) Costs as a % of Income for 
the Regional Typical Household 
1801 57.17601 6.921031 32 93 
       
Relocation/Geospatial Controls: 
      
Job Access score Job Access Score (0-10), based on access 
to jobs and variety of employment types. 
1801 3.323876 1.841318 0 9.9 
Compact neighborhood score Compact Neighborhood Score (0-10). A 
combined measure of household density 
and walkability to transit and services  
1801 1.334703 1.183226 0 9 
Vehicle miles traveled/household Annual vehicle miles traveled per 
regional typical household; a measure of 
transit access; an increase should 
decrease voter turnout; should increase 
Republican clustering (Nall 2015) 
1801 25322.73 2816.729 1163 36396 
       
Demographic Controls: 
      
% Nonwhite voters The percentage of a county's population 
that does not identify as "White only", 
based on Census Bureau data 
1801 18.80839 17.50829 0 97.54143 
County median income, % of Nat’l  The county's median household income 
as a percent of the national median 
household income. Numbers below 100 
are below the national median income. 
1801 93.41756 24.11745 45.46923 236.0281 
% below poverty line The percent of the county's population 
below the federal poverty line. 
1801 16.3628 6.061142 3.1 45 
avg_nonwhiteCVAP percent of county's population that 
doesn't identify as "White only"; 
averaged from 2008, 2012, and 2016 
Census data 
1801 18.78255 17.39108 0.6633876 97.87195 
Education, % completed Bachelors The percent of the population having 
completed a Bachelors degree or higher. 
Taken from USDA 2017. 
1801 23.0286 9.963146 6.4 78.8 
       
State fixed effects, Dummy 
Variable: 
      
State Fixed Effects The unique code (State FIPS) that 
identifies the state in which a county is 
located.  Used for creating a dummy 
variable for state fixed effects. 
1801 30.48251 15.13542 1 56 
       
Unit of Analysis Descriptors: 
      
county_FIPS A five digit code which identifies the 
state and the county, the first two digits 
are the state's FIPS code (S) while the 
following three digits represent the 
county (C) code (ex: SS-CCC) 
1801 30584.96 15158.41 1001 56041 
population Resident population in the county in 
2013 
1801 162037.9 406611.5 382 9888601 
households number of households in county in 2013 1801 59941.17 142430.4 159 3228672 
land_acres Area of county in acres 1801 579577.2 885973.9 1271.3 1.28E+07 
 
The primary dataset used was merged into a single excel sheet through the use 
Microsoft Excel’s VLOOKUP function.  The transportation portion of the data was 
downloaded individually through the Housing+Transportation Affordability Index website in 
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.csv format, and each state’s dataset was merged into a single .csv sheet through Window’s 
“Command Prompt” command:  
C:\..., copy *.csv merged.csv    
This data comes from the Center for Neighborhood Technology’s 2013 Housing and 
Transportation Affordability Index (2016).  Added to this dataset was the vote totals for each 
county in the 2008, 2012, and 2016 presidential elections.  This data was aggregated by a 
third party source which reports that its original source was The Guardian and Townhall.com 
(McGovern & Larson 2017).  A brief check on their sources uncovered their Guardian source 
to be viable for the main year under observation for this research, the 2012 presidential 
election, but the existence of the original Townhall.com data could not be ascertained (The 
Guardian 2012).  For future research knowledge of Geographic Information Systems software 
such as ARCGIS would be extremely useful for aggregating official data sources with 
geographic components.  The remaining control variable data came from the United States 
Census Bureau’s Citizen Voting Age Population estimates (2009; 20012; 2017).  Data added 
to the primary dataset from this source included the raw data for calculating the voter turnout 
and the nonwhite population and for each county and for the election year.  Demographic 
data on poverty levels and median household income comes from the Census Bureau’s Small 
Area Income and Poverty Estimates (2012). Data on education levels for each county came 
from the USDA’s Economic Research Service (2017).    The statewide vote data for the 2012 
presidential election was taken from the Federal Election Commission’s official calculations 
and was used to calculate the state based 2012 Dissimilarity value (2013). 
 Calculating the absolute values of the dependent variables and the log of the 
independent variables were done through Stata commands.  The remaining calculations that 
were necessary were done through Excel.  These include the voter turnout, the average vote 
differential, the Dissimilarity values, and the percentage of the population that does not 
identify as white-only, to name a few.  For compatibility reasons all of the variables 
measured as a percent in fraction form were multiplied by a hundred so that 1 means 1% 
throughout the dataset to avoid 1 meaning 100% for some of the data.  This means, for 
example, that on all of the regression table results for all of the variables measured as 
percentages a coefficient of 5 would mean that a 1 percent increase in that variable would 
have a 5 unit increase, or 5 percent increase, on the dependent variable. 
 
